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Abstract 
The significance of déjà vu is widely recognised in the context of temporal lobe 
epilepsy, and enquiry about déjà vu is frequently made in the clinical assessment of 
patients with possible epilepsy. Déjà vu has also been associated with several 
psychiatric disorders. The historical context of current understanding of déjà vu is 
discussed. The literature reveals déjà vu to be a common phenomenon consistent 
with normality. Several authors have suggested the existence of a “pathological” form 
of déjà vu that differs, qualitatively or quantitatively, from “non-pathological” déjà vu. 
The features of déjà vu suggesting neurological or psychiatric pathology are 
discussed. Several neuroanatomical and psychological models of the déjà vu 
experience are highlighted, implicating the perceptual, mnemonic and affective 
regions of the lateral temporal cortex, hippocampus and amygdala in the genesis of 
déjà vu. A possible genetic basis for a neurochemical model of déjà vu is discussed. 
Clinical approaches to the patient presenting with possible déjà vu are proposed. 
 
Introduction 
To those that have experienced it first hand, déjà vu is a unique and unforgettable 
experience. To those that have not, its description may seem impenetrable or 
abnormal. It has eluded explanation and fascinated neurologists, psychologists, 
philosophers and the public for centuries. This article discusses a widely accepted 
definition of déjà vu; the history of its study; explanations of déjà vu from the fields of 
parapsychology, psychology, psychodynamics neuroanatomy and molecular 
genetics; and its clinical significance in terms of incidence, neuropathology and 
assessment. To a recent review by Warren- Gash and Zeman, it adds detail of 
theories of déjà vu and recent neuroanatomical and genetic work. 
 
Definition 
V M Neppe proposed a definition of déjà vu in 1983 as “any subjectively 
inappropriate impression of familiarity of a present experience with an undefined 
past” [39]. The definition is precisely worded and provides useful insights into the 
phenomenon. The word “any” is intended to convey aetiological neutrality, implying 
that the experience need not originate from any particular pathological entity, or 
indeed any cause at all. The “subjectively inappropriate” nature of déjà vu is critical to 
its understanding, as it implies insight into the unusual nature of the experience. The 
subject simultaneously seems to recognise a situation, yet knows that recognition to 
be impossible.Taking this further, the definition implies (though does not state) that 
the subject will try to explain the sense of familiarity and struggle to pinpoint its 
source but, frustratingly, cannot do so. 
 
The term “impression” is a deliberately all-encompassing term for the experience that 
reinforces its holistic nature. Déjà vu is not confined to affect, thought process, 
perceptions or cognition but involves all of these aspects. Specifically, it is not 
confined to the visual domain. The alternative “deja vécu” has been suggested [39] 
as being less biased towards the visual; but the term “déjà vu” has such an 
established place in the literature (scientific and otherwise), as well as in colloquial 
parlance, that there is little to be gained from changing it. An extended catalogue of 
“déjà” experiences – such as entendu (heard), pensé (thought), gouté (tasted) and 
rencontré (met) [39],while useful descriptively, does little to clarify matters of 
definition. 
 
“Familiarity” is the cornerstone of déjà vu. Again, the term used is inclusive, 
encompassing both recognition – the scene seems literally to have been “seen 
before”– and acquaintance – which suggests a more intimate familiarity with every 
detail of the scene. Here, Neppe implies the tantalising feeling that the subject can 
predict what will happen next – despite which, such apparent prescience is of course 
misguided. Finally, the definition relates the experience to an “undefined past” – or 
perhaps more definitively, a nonexistent past. This hints at a subject’s often frantic 
and frustrating efforts to pinpoint the moment in question [47]. 
 
True déjà vu is to be distinguished from a number of similar phenomena that may 
mimic or be falsely described as déjà vu. Jamais vu is an inappropriate unfamiliarity 
with a situation that has been encountered before – the converse of déjà vu. 
Flashbacks include visual and auditory illusions and hallucinations, and give the 
sense that the subject has actually been transported to the midst of a prior 
experience. Depersonalisation is a dissociative phenomenon involving a sense of 
detachment from the self [2]. Colloquial déjà vu refers to the incorrect description of a 
genuinely recurring or unwanted phenomenon as evoking a sense of déjà vu [50]. 
The dreamy state is an experimental surrogate for déjà vu in epileptic patients: 
induced by extrinsic brain stimulation, it shares many features of déjà vu but with 
clouding of consciousness [4, 36]. 
Historical perspective 
Déjà vu was first referred to by St Augustine in c 400 AD as “falsae memoriae”. 
Despite earlier appearances in literature, medical attention was not refocused on the 
phenomenon until 1844 when the psychiatrist Arthur Ladbroke Wigan referred to it as 
“the sentiment of pre-existence” [52]. The term “déjà vu” was coined by FL Arnaud in 
1896, in an attempt to reflect its aetiological uncertainty (unlike other terms such as 
“fausse mémoire”) [3]. Despite erroneously implying that the experience is limited to 
visual perception, the term has become widely accepted and has passed into 
common parlance [47]. A number of subjective accounts of déjà vu are found in 
prose and poetry, including the writings of Sir Walter Scott [45], Charles Dickens 
[11],Leo Tolstoy [49],Marcel Proust [43] and Thomas Hardy [23]. 
 
Perhaps the most insightful account, touching on the subject’s attempt to predict and 
control the experience, can be found in Catch-22 by Joseph Heller: For a few 
precarious seconds, the chaplain tingled with a weird, occult sensation of having 
experienced the identical situation before in some prior time or existence. He 
endeavoured to trap and nourish the impression in order to predict, and perhaps 
even control, what incident would occur next, but the afflatus melted away, as he had 
known beforehand it would [25]. 
Explanatory theories 
The question of what causes déjà vu is one that has intrigued both scientists and the 
public alike for many years. As an unusual, ephemeral and diffuse phenomenon, 
déjà vu lends itself to imaginative speculation but is difficult to define experimentally 
and study meticulously. Consequently, many of the theories of déjà vu, while 
interesting and persuasive, lack any foundation in evidence. More recently, plausible 
neuroanatomical models of déjà vu based on neurosurgical and radiological work 
have been proposed, and molecular genetic findings in epilepsy may herald a 
neurochemical basis for the phenomenon. 
Parapsychology 
Parapsychological theories are mentioned here purely for interest. Such theories 
include: the suggestion that déjà vu arises from past life memories through 




Hughlings Jackson coined the term “mental diplopia” to describe the phenomenon of 
déjà vu in 1888 [27] and several theories evoke this notion of splitting of the brain in 
déjà vu.Wigan, Jensen and Maudsley proposed that the two cerebral hemispheres 
function separately but synchronously and suggest that déjà vu arises as a result of a 
loss of synchronicity between the two parts [28, 32, 52]. Myers proposed that each 
hemisphere contains a subliminal or supraliminal “self” and déjà vu 3 arises as a 
result of double perception of a scene by both selves simultaneously [37]. According 
to Jessen, déjà vu occurs when an appropriate sense of recognition of a small part of 
a scene is inappropriately extended to the scene as a whole [29]. Lalande and 
Berndt-Larsson suggested that déjà vu is a primary disturbance of time perception, 
such that events occurring a moment ago are interpreted as having been seen long 
before [5, 31]. This is in keeping with the suggestion of an association between déjà 
vu and psychiatric disorders involving distorted time perception [39]. 
 
Gestalt psychology proposes that perceptions and the affect they generate are 
organised by the brain into object- affect entities. According to this theory, déjà vu 
results when an object is encountered that stimulates a given affect. That affect 
inappropriately causes recall of a dissimilar object, resulting in an inappropriate 
feeling of familiarity [46]. De Nayer proposes a “tape recorder” hypothesis of déjà vu. 
He suggests that, as in a tape recorder, perception is converted to memory by a 
neurological “recording head”, and memory recall is carried out by a “reproducing 
head”. In déjà vu, sensory information is somehow simultaneously recorded and 
reproduced, and therefore perceived and remembered simultaneously [10]. 
Psychodynamics 
Freud proposed that déjà vu is triggered by perception of a situation with some 
similarity to a suppressed fantasy, causing the fantasy to be awakened as a wish to 
improve the present situation. Thus, déjà vu is a manifestation of a wish for the 
turning back of time [14]. Oberndorf agreed that déjà vu is a defence mechanism and 
suggested that it is a psychic means of reassurance in situations of adversity: “you 
went through all this once before and came out well. The same will happen this time.” 
He proposed that déjà vu would be better called “encore vu”, meaning “seen again” 
rather than “seen before”[40]. His theory is consistent with the finding that some 
subjects find déjà vu pleasurable [42]. Finally, some psychoanalysts have suggested 
that déjà vu may be a form of waking dream, or a daytime residue of dreams. In 
support of this Zuger claims,based on small-scale studies, that some people neither 
dream nor experience déjà vu [54]. Freud went so far as to suggest that the source 
of many déjà vu experiences was “the genitals of the dreamer’s mother; there is 
indeed no other place about which one can assert with such conviction that one has 
been there before” [13]. 
 
Neuroanatomy 
Over a century ago Jackson highlighted the association between temporal lobe 
epilepsy, with associated “mental diplopia” phenomena, and neuroanatomical 
malformations of the temporal lobe [27]. In 1959, Mullan and Penfield performed 
electrical stimulation and intracranial EEG recording during temporal lobe resection 
in epileptic patients, and elicited a “dreamy state” akin to déjà vu [36]. In 
1978,Halgren obtained similar results by stimulating the deeper structures of the 
hippocampus and floor of the amygdala but could not reproducibly do so in the non-
diseased hemisphere [22]. In 1982, Gloor and colleagues [18] used stereotactically 
implanted depth electrodes (consisting of long, thin electrode strands) to monitor 
“experiential phenomena” in epileptic patients, and sought to reproduce them by 
electrical stimulation. Déjà vu was experienced in 4 of 35 patients studied, though 
their neuroanatomical conclusions were based on the much broader pooled findings 
from all experiential phenomena, including such diverse entities as auditory and 
visual hallucinations, flashbacks, fear and thirst. 
 
Like Halgren, Gloor and colleagues emphasised the importance of limbic rather than 
temporal neocortical structures (Fig. 1b), declaring that “unless limbic structures are 
activated . . . experiential phenomena do not occur”. Limbic activation, they propose, 
“may be essential for bringing to a conscious level percepts elaborated by the 
temporal cortex”. Though the majority of experiental phenomena observed were 
associated with activation of all four areas studied (amygdala, hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus and temporal neocortex), they report 37 instances where the 
temporal neocortex was not activated. The authors further posit an anteroposterior 
gradient of excitability within the limbic system, the amygdala being most easily 
stimulated to generate experiential phenomena, followed decrementally by the 
hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus. However, the authors admit,“ with our 
approach only a relatively narrow sector of neocortex was accessible to stimulation 
and recording”, which may have led to underestimation of neocortical involvement. 
Moreover, they do report one instance of déjà vu produced by temporal neocortical 
stimulation without electrical spread to the deeper structures [18]. 
 
Bancaud and colleagues in 1994 attempted to synthesise the theories of Mullan, 
Penfield and Halgren and hypothesised that lateral stimulation of the kind studied by 
Mullan and Penfield caused déjà vu through medial spread from the temporal lobe to 
the amygdala and hippocampus. They studied sixteen temporal lobe epilepsy 
patients with pre-surgical implanted electrodes and simultaneously stimulated and 
measured from the temporal lobe, amygdala and hippocampus. They found that 
spontaneously occurring “dreamy states” always resulted in activation of all three 
areas – and that the dreamy state could be experimentally evoked by stimulating any 
one of the three – but that stimulation of the deeper structures was ten times more 
likely to evoke such states. Bancaud suggests that the hippocampus and amygdala 
are thus key to the déjà vu experience, with the temporal neocortex playing a 
secondary but important role [4]. Bancaud’s theory is that a neural network in the 
association cortex and limbic areas encodes the holistic experience of an event. 
Perceptual information is encoded by the temporal neocortex and stored in the 
hippocampus, with emotional content added by amygdala (Fig. 1a). 
 
According to this theory, the dreamy state, and by extension déjà vu, is caused by 
inappropriate activation of deep memory structures by superficial sensory structures 
(Fig. 1c). Effectively, this amounts to a “neuroanatomical tape recorder” model of 
déjà vu [4]. Returning to the topic of experiential phenomena in temporal lobe 
epilepsy in 1990, Gloor [16] maintained the importance, suggested by his earlier 
work [18], of limbic rather than neocortical structures, but incorporated more recent 
ideas about distributed parallel cortical networks [19, 20] into a theory of how such 
events are triggered in epilepsy. Like Bancaud, he suggested that a neural network 
throughout the cortex and limbic system encodes an experience and is specific for it. 
 
No single area or cell is indispensable in such a network, and the order of activation 
is less important than its spatial pattern. Stimulation of any part of the network can 
result in activation of the whole, and thus result in the evocation of a complete 
experience. He did not posit a specific neuroanatomical substrate for déjà vu, but his 
theories on the key role of the limbic system and the importance of parallel neural 
networks in encoding and evoking experiential phenomena,are complementary to 
Bancaud’s tripartite neuroanatomical model of déjà vu [4] (Fig. 1c). 
 
One area of relative consensus in déjà vu research is that of lateralisation. From their 
early work, Mullan and Penfield suggested that déjà vu was predominantly a function 
of the temporal lobe non-dominant for language [36]. In a report of a patient with ictal 
déjà vu and seizures of right hippocampal origin, Gloor concluded that déjà vu, if 
strictly defined, is sufficient to localise an epileptogenic focus to the right temporal 
lobe [17]. Questioning the neuroanatomical value of stimulation studies, Weinand 
and colleagues [51] used subdural strip electrocorticographic monitoring in 8 epileptic 
patients with preictal déjà vu. 6 were right-handed and 2 left-handed. Using 
intracarotid amytal testing, they established that all 8 patients were left hemisphere 
dominant for language. In all 8, seizures arose in the hemisphere non-dominant for 
handedness (that is, the hemisphere ipsilateral to the dominant hand). They 
concluded that “handedness rather than language dominance appears to be a more 
consistent predictor of ictal déjà vu lateralisation”and suggest the value of déjà vu as 
a localising and lateralising characteristic in epilepsy [51]. This contrasts sharply with 
the failure of Gloor and colleagues to find lateralising features when they examined 
“experiential phenomena” as a whole – including those in the visual and auditory 
domains and jamais vu [18]. 
 
Déjà vu is apparently exceptional in respect of its lateralising power. In 1999 Adachi 
et al. used positron emission tomography to study the functional anatomy of the déjà 
vu experience in 31 patients with temporal lobe epilepsy, with and without déjà vu as 
an ictal feature. In the patients with déjà vu, they found significantly reduced glucose 
metabolism in the mesial temporal and parietal cortex. They concluded that temporal 
lobe dysfunction is necessary but not sufficient for the generation of déjà vu, but that 
the presence of déjà vu in temporal lobe epilepsy was of no lateralising value [1]. 
Though, unlike the previous neuroanatomical work [4, 22, 36], this study has the 




Autosomal dominant lateral temporal epilepsy (ADLTE), also known as autosomal 
dominant partial epilepsy with auditory features, is a focal epilepsy syndrome first 
described in 1995 [41]. It usually begins in the early twenties, is relatively mild, and is 
characterised by recurrent seizures with aura consistent with temporal lobe onset. 
Auditory hallucinations predominate, but visual, olfactory and gustatory symptoms 
have been reported [53]. Though its presence is by no means invariable, déjà vu has 
been reported as a prominent feature in several cases [15, 53] and may be the sole 
ictal feature [9]. The syndrome demonstrates autosomal dominant inheritance with 
high penetrance [41]. The causative gene has been identified as LGI1/epitempin, 
mapped to chromosomal region 10q24 [12, 30, 35]. Mutations in this gene are 
invariably found in affected individuals, while no mutations were found in 123 
unaffected controls [30]. The function of LGI1 is unknown, but it is expressed 
throughout the human brain in neuronal tissue, in what appears to be a highly 
regulated manner,with three different protein products expressed differentially 
between cells and brain regions. A role in cell-cell communication has been 
proposed for the gene products, possibly as a regulator of cell migration or 
transmembrane receptor or channel [30, 34, 35]. LGI1 is certainly not a “gene for 
déjà vu”: not all those with LGI1 mutations experience ictal déjà vu, and the gene is 
apparently not mutated in normal individuals, some of whom may be expected to 
experience déjà vu (see Incidence below). However, given the association between 
ADTLE and preictal déjà vu, study of the gene and its role in brain development and 
function has the potential to shed light on the genetic and molecular basis of déjà vu. 
LGI1 demonstrates locus heterogeneity – that is, different mutations may produce 
different clinical syndromes [34]. Thus, the gene may be expressed or responded 
differently to in individuals who experience déjà vu. Further study of the structure and 
function of the LGI1 gene and its products in individuals who experience déjà vu, with 
and without epilepsy, is required to move towards a neurochemical explanation for 
déjà vu. 
Clinical significance 
Déjà vu is common in the general population. It can be associated with neurological 
and psychiatric illness but is compatible with neuropsychiatric normality [7, 21, 24, 
26, 33, 38, 39]. 
Incidence 
Numerous studies have attempted to discover the prevalence of déjà vu experiences 
in the general population and patient groups. Given the nature of the déjà vu 
experience, all such studies are faced with problems of patient selection and 
definition. Between 31% and 96% of “normal” respondents reported having 
experienced déjà vu [7, 24, 26, 33, 38]. In two direct comparisons of normal subjects 
with psychiatric or “neuropsychiatric”patients, déjà vu was less frequent in the normal 
groups (51 % vs 65 % [21] and 68% vs 73 % [39]).No significant differences have 
been found in gender or race, but there is some suggestion that younger age, 
education and socio-economic status are associated with increased rates of déjà vu 
[7, 21, 24, 26, 33, 38, 39]. 
Déjà vu in neuropathology 
Given that déjà vu is anecdotally linked to pathological entities but consistent with 
normality, it is clear that it is not sufficient simply to ask a patient “Do you experience 
déjà vu?” when suspecting neurological or psychiatric pathology. It has been 
suggested that there may be two qualitatively distinct forms of déjà vu: a 
nonpathological form (referred to as déjà éprouvé, with rapid onset, short duration 
and full insight) and a pathological form (called reduplicative paramnesia, with 
gradual onset, long duration and impaired insight). 
 
Distinguishing between these two forms is claimed to enable identification of 
underlying disease based on the patient’s description of their déjà vu experience [5]. 
Other authors hold that the differences between déjà vu in normality and pathology 
are qualitative and that scrutinising experiences of déjà vu cannot be used to rule out 
neuropathology [3]. Disease states associated with déjà vu, they suggest, should be 
recognised by the associated features of the experience – “the company it keeps” 
[39]. As first reported by Jackson, déjà vu in temporal lobe epilepsy is often 
distinguishable by its associated features. Jackson reported hallucinations; a 
“voluminous mental state” and “mental diplopia”, by which he probably meant 
dissociative phenomena; epigastric phenomena (the unpleasant sensation of rising 
or falling); fear; automatisms and, of course, seizures [27]. The significance of déjà 
vu in psychiatry is less clearly established but it is thought to be a manifestation of 
many major psychiatric disorders [44]. It is intuitively reasonable that déjà vu may be 
a lesser manifestation of phenomena seen in frank psychiatric disease. For example, 
anxiety and panic states may cause feelings of impending disaster; depression can 
cause distorted time perception; depersonalisation and derealisation result in 
disturbances of familiarity and sensory perception; psychosis may cause 
hallucinations or even delusions of precognition. The key discriminant in this setting 
is the patient’s insight. Impaired reality testing, intrusiveness and incorporation of 
déjà vu into a delusional system may suggest psychopathology. Duration is also of 
importance: when déjà vu is instantaneous and self-terminating, it is less likely to be 
due to psychopathology than if it is prolonged and cannot be terminated [47]. 
Assessment of déjà vu 
Sno and colleagues have suggested a detailed and rigorous Inventory for Déjà vu 
Experiences Assessment [48]. In practice, an informal system of triage for the further 
evaluation of patients complaining of déjà vu is perhaps more useful. Warren-Gash 
and Zeman have proposed such a system. The first step is to establish that the 
patient is experiencing true déjà vu rather than similar phenomena such as 
depersonalisation, flashbacks or colloquial déjà vu. Next, the patient is placed into 
one of three categories according to the features associated with the déjà vu. If the 
experience is occasional, tran6 sient or isolated, the déjà vu can safely be interpreted 
as “probably normal”. If there is evidence of depression, anxiety or psychosis, a 
psychiatric line of enquiry should be followed. If the experience is frequent, 
prolonged, associated with physical sensations or automatisms, and if there are 
seizures, the likely explanation is temporal lobe epilepsy [50]. 
Conclusion 
Déjà vu is a common phenomenon consistent with both neuropsychiatric normality 
and pathology. Numerous theories have been suggested as to the cause of déjà vu; 
and a neuroanatomical substrate has been suggested, but all neuroanatomical 
studies to date have been carried out in patients with abnormal brains who may not 
have been experiencing true déjà vu. Study of the molecular genetics of autosomal 
dominant lateral temporal epilepsy shows promise for the elucidation of a 
neurochemical basis of déjà vu. In patients with frequent déjà vu, pathology is 
suggested by both qualitative and quantitative findings: a detailed history of exactly 
what the patient means by déjà vu is essential, and the features associated with déjà 
vu are the key to further elucidation. 
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Fig. 1 Simplified schematic diagram of the neuroanatomical models of déjà vu. (a) Bancaud’s theory of 
memory storage; (b) Gloor’s and Halgren’s early models of déjà vu, with amygdala pivotal, and neocortical 
activation relatively unimportant; (c) Neural network model incorporating Gloor’s and Bancaud’s theories, with 
mutual activation of limbic and neocortical areas. A amygdala; H hippocampus; T temporal neocortex, asterisk 
indicates proposed origin of activation in déjà vu [4, 16, 18, 22] 5 
